ABSTRACT.
Altruisme
The constraint is the inter-temporal budget constraint of generation t obtained from equations (4) (5) and (7)- (12) Since the stability is not guaranteed in the regime without bequest, it is useful to study the bifurcations that arise when the equilibrium looses its stability. 
Steady State
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Local Dynamics
We know that if 8 < 8 bequests are positive and, following Proposition 2, the steady state is locally stable. When 8 > 8 it is not necessarily the case. Let us notice the following elements:
-since the production function is Cobb-Douglas, Assumption 2 is always satisfied and indeterminacy is excluded (Lemma 2).
-when y = 0, the standard Diamond model with Cobb-Douglas prefe rences and technology is stable.
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The region for which this condition is verified is plotted in figure 3.
We first notice that the income effect always dominates the self-restraint effect if 8 is low, that is if the capital stock is low. In that case, the interest factor is high, w' is high too, and the wage reacts much to a change in ?.
Secondly, the income effect dominates the self-restraint effect when the degree of altruism is low. Indeed, a low level of altruism implies a low level of capital, and we may conduct the same reasoning as above.
Finally, notice that figure 3 compared to figure 2 illustrates the fact that wf < 1 is a sufficient condition for stability in the no bequest regime.
Global Dynamics with a Numerical Example
The study of the global dynamics cannot be done analytically because endo ko is equal to zero (panel "regime"). In the periods t = 1,2 there is a very rapid growth of the capital stock and of consumption. This very rapid take off makes optimal for the parents not to leave bequest, because they know that their future generations will soon benefit from higher resources. In fact, they would like to make negative bequests, transferring resources away from the future generations to their generation but that is impossible. We thus observe a regime shift at t = 1. Standard-of living aspirations rise very rapidly and attain a maximum at t = 5, ie, one period after the consumption when adult. These rising aspirations depress saving considerably and the capital stock starts declining. At t = 4 the middle-aged generation anticipates that their children will not be able to maintain their consumption level compared to the one of their parents, and it becomes optimal for them to leave positive bequests again. The regime of the economy changes, and will remain in the positive bequest case until convergence to the steady state.
This numerical analysis illustrates the complex interaction of altruism and inherited tastes and shows that the global dynamics can be characterized by regime shifts.
Concluding Comments
Assuming that children compare their consumption level with a benchmark derived from the standard-of-living of their parents, we have obtained a bunch of original results concerning the role of altruism in the economy.
We have first analyzed in details the dynamics in two regimes, one with and the other without bequest. The regime with (positive) bequest is similar to the
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This content downloaded from 130.104. In this paper, agents are homogenous. In particular they all have the same level of aspirations. An extension with heterogenous agents with different initial aspirations might be useful to study how migrants (with lower aspira tions) can progressively be integrated in a given economy.
